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whole processes of general system development
(Baskerville, 1993; Booysen and Eloff, 1995; Marshall et
al., 1995; Mostert and Solms, 1994). SE process is
defined as "a set of activities to gain understanding of the
security risks, establish a balanced set of security needs in
according to identified risks, transform security needs into
security functions, establish assurance in the correctness
or effectiveness of security mechanism, determine that
operational impacts due to residual security vulnerabilities
in a system or its operation is tolerable, and integrate the
efforts of all engineering disciplines"(SSECMM
1999:26). Booysen and Eloff (1995) suggested that SE
activities be integrated into the initial design of an IS to
achieve the better security. Baskerville (1993) also stated
that the separation of security function from systems
designs cause the unsecured system, because each of
security designer and general function designer develops
the systems based on its own focus. Mostert and Solms
(1994) asserted that add-on approach costs ten times more
than the SE approach that integrates SE process into
software lifecycle process standard. SE process activities
defined by the previous studies are summarized in Table
1.
However, the previous studies have several limitations
to be generally applied in the real world. At first, they
were not based on the generalized system development
process in that they developed under specific application
domain or specific theoretical backgrounds. For example,
common criteria (CC) come from secure product
evaluation, while system security engineering capability
maturity model (SSE-CMM) from the evaluation of an
organization's security maturity level (SEI 1997).
Therefore, their activities differ from each other. Second,
they generally did not consider the integration of the SE
process into software lifecycle process standard, even
though some studies (e.g., Tompkins and Rice, 1986,
Marshall et al., 1995) attempted to consider it based on
the specific standards (e.g., Mil-Std-2167A). It gives the
difficulty to the acquirers because they do not have
enough SE knowledge to suggest the exact security
requirements and manage and control the project
efficiently. Developers also experience a difficulty
because they have been involved in IS projects that
require a small number of security functions. This
problem is shown in Figure 1.

Abstract
In developing an information systems (IS), most
organizations have preferred a traditional add-on
approach that adds commercial security products after an
IS development project is finished. However, a number of
recent incidents with regard to IS security indicate that
this approach does not guarantee IS security because
commercial products are not designed for the specific
organizational IS environments. As an alternative
solution, previous studies suggested that organizations
integrate both the security engineering (SE) process and
software development lifecycle (SDLC) process
standards. Unfortunately, a few studies tried to suggest
the limited integration models. In this paper, as a practical
way for the development of secure IS, we suggest two SE
process models. First, we develop the generalized SE
model that includes all SE activities through the whole
SDLC. Secondly, we suggest the process integration
model that interweaves SE with IEEE/EIA 12207 through
Delphi analysis.

Background
Although today’s businesses highly depend on
information systems, most organizations still do not
consider IS security an important issue (e.g., Straub and
Welke, 1998). Further, managers think that the investment
in IS security is an overhead with "intangible benefit"
(Piper, 1994) and including a SE process into SDLC
might cause performance loss, inflexibility, and higher
cost, and then they prefer the add-on approach that adds
commercial security products after the system
development is completed. However, this add-on
approach does not guarantee to effectively protect IS,
because the commercial security products developed for a
general purpose are not designed to meet inherent
requirements of each organization which has an
inherently unique IS environment (Tettero et al., 1997).
Due to this weakness of the add-on approach, many
security incidents have repeatedly occurred (e.g.,
Shimeall and McDermott, 1999).
For the solution to developing a more secure system,
studies have asserted that SE process be regarded as an
important issue from the very beginning of system
development projects and further be integrated into the
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Table. 1 The Previous Researches Dealing With SE process activities
RESEARCH
TCSEC
(1985)
Tompkins &
Rice (1986)

Badenhorst &
Eloff (1989)

Weiss (1991)
Bodeau (1994)
Marshall et.al
(1995)
Booysen & Eloff
(1995)
CC(1996)
Tettero et al.
(1997)
SSE-CMM
(1997)

SE PROCESS ACTIVITIES
Audit, Trusted Path, System Architecture, System Integrity, Security Testing, Design Spec. and
Verification, Covert Channel Analysis, Trusted Facility Mgt, Configuration Mgt, Trusted Recovery,
Trusted Distribution, and Documentations
Sensitivity Determination, Security Objective, Security Risks Assessment, Security Feasibility Study,
Security Requirement Analysis, Security Test Plan Development, Security Specifications Design,
Security Test Procedures Development, Security Relevant Code Writing, Documentation, Security
Test & Evaluation, Security Test Analysis & Certification Report
Top Manager's Computer Security Awareness and Support, SE Steering Committee Appointment,
Security Policy Establishments, The Scope of Security Definition, Risk Analysis, Technical Security
Measures' Installation, Detection, On-going Security Administration, Documentation and Reports,
Training, Security Auditing, Change Control
Baseline Architecture Identification, Threat Identification, Threat Analysis and Decomposition, Risk
Assessment, Prioritization of Vulnerabilities, Identification of Candidate Safeguards, Safeguard Tradeoff Analysis, Security Architecture Selection, Security Architecture Integration and Iteration
Security Requirement Analysis, Identification and Analysis of Functional Flows, Security Test,
Evaluation, and Transition Plan
Security Requirements, Security Model, Security Risk and Vulnerability Analysis, Security
Architecture, DTLS, FTLS, Covert Channel Analysis, Security Testing, Documentation, and
Certification & Accreditation
Sensitivity Analysis, Security Risk Analysis, Security Prototype, Security Requirement Validation,
Security Model, Information Flow Analysis, Audit, Design Security Control, Test Safeguards,
Security Report, Security Documentation
Security Audit, Trusted Path, Development, Testing, Vulnerability Assessment, Configuration
Management, Lifecycle Support, Guidance Documents, Delivery and Operation
Security Minds, Security Policy, Security Requirement, Threat Analysis, Description of System
Environments, Feasibility Analysis, System Specification, Security Framework, Security Component
Building, Operation and Change Management
Admin. Sec. Controls, Assess Impact, Assess Security Risk, Assess Threat, Assess Vulnerability,
Build Assurance Argument, Coordinate Security, Monitor Security Posture, Provide Security Input,
Specify Security Needs, Verify and Validate Security

Figure 1. Problems Related to SE

Therefore, both of them require the general guideline
for the development of secure systems.
To meet this requirement, in this paper, we address
two models of SE process. First, we introduce the
generalized SE process model that integrates all of SE
activities into the whole processes of SDLC. It is not the
new one, but the result of analyzing and regrouping SE
activities of previous studies and conducting the
interviews with IS experts. Second, based on this
generalized model, we suggest the process integration
model that incorporates SE process with IEEE/EIA
12207. The model suggests the way to connect SE
activities to software lifecycle process and its lifecycle
data.

SE Process Model
We first developed the process model consisting of
twenty-five activities based on the previous research, and
then performed the interview with nine IS experts and
asked for the appropriateness of the new model. There
were several different opinions about the model. One of
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lifecycle data consist of eighty-four items including thirty
primary components.
We tried to integrate SE process into IEEE/EIA 12207
in two areas. One is to connect SE process activities to
software lifecycle process activities and the other is to
interrelate SE process to lifecycle data. The former is
important in the view of combining general software
development process with SE process, and the latter is
important in the view of designating the right place to
store outputs of SE process activities. Higginbotham and
Maley (1998) suggested the purpose of the integration "by
integrating security engineering process into system
development, system developers can satisfy the acquirer's
concern and the acquirer can satisfy about the quality of
security services offered"(p. 321).

the big issues was about the level of details related to SE
process activities. Most interviewees agreed to the
detailed classification, while the others wanted to reduce
the number of activities. Specially, two experts wanted to
reduce SE activities. Security management was pointed
out by most of interviewees that consider it an important
issue for the flexible communication medium between
acquirers and developers during SDLC. They mentioned
the building of the special team for SE to support this
activity. On the contrary to our expectation, the experts
mainly emphasized the managerial issues, such as security
management, managerial support, and training. As a result
of the interview, we modified the previous model, added
four activities, merged two activities, and removed two
activities. The newly added activities are managerial
support, building security management team, user
trainings, and fault analysis and fixing. Security model
and architecture design, and security operation concept
and scenario description are merged into one, while
security objective and contingency planning are removed.
Figure 2 shows SE process model, including the feedback
mechanism, and Table 2 summarizes SE process
activities.

Delphi Analysis
To develop a process integration model, we performed
two-stage Delphi analysis. Delphi analysis is a useful tool
when judgment from experts is inevitable (Rowe et al
1991). We carefully selected the experts who have
experiences on secure system development. This analysis
was conducted with thirty-three IS experts consisting of
five security experts, six system designers, thirteen
system developers, and nine project managers. They
turned out to have 5.1 years' field experience, and 2.2
times experience of secure system development in
average. This analysis was a two-stage iterative process.
Before we started the 1st stage analysis, we met and
explained the purpose of our research and handed out a
questionnaire and a form with several materials to help
their understanding (i.e., summary about both SE and
IEEE/EIA 12207). The form is for describing problem
suggestions about the integration. In the middle of the
questionnaire, we asserted the pictures that consist of SE
activities, IEEE/EIA 12207's primary process activities
and lifecycle data. Each expert then drew the line to show
their opinions about the relationship among them, and
expressed the appropriateness of connection using threepoint Likert-style scales that contain one meaning a 'weak'
relationship and three meaning a 'strong' relationship.

Figure 2. SE Process Model

SE Process Integration Model

The Results of Delphi Analysis

Based on SE model, we suggested the process
integration model of SE process activities with IEEE/EIA
12207. For the integration, we adopt IEEE/EIA 12207 as
a software lifecycle process standard since it has been
used as a standard of both industry and military software
development projects (IEEE 1998). It defines the role of
acquirer, supplier, developer, operator and maintainer
during SDLC and gives the guideline of processes and
outputs for software development. Lifecycle processes of
IEEE/EIA 12207 consist of five primary, eight
organizational, and four supporting processes. And its

After conducting the first stage, we calculated the
weighted average of the measures. We also gathered and
analyzed forms from experts. Based on these analyses, we
could find three main things. One was to include the
supporting and organizational process in this model. The
previous questionnaire only included primary processes of
IEEE/EIA 12207. Instead of drawing the line between SE
activities and primary process activities, twenty-one
experts suggested incorporating these two processes with
primary process at the form. The other issue was security
management. Security experts and project managers
showed their strong interest in security management and
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Table 2. Security Engineering Activities
PROCESS

Acquisition
&
Supply
Process

PROCESS
ACTIVITY
Top manager &
Employee Support
and Involvement
RFP Descriptions
Proposal Evaluation
Security Team
Building
Security Policy
Enforcement
User & Developer
Training
Security Requirement
Analysis
Risk analysis
Security Operation
Concepts& Scenario
Development

Development
Process

Security Model &
Security Architecture
Development
Security Spec. Desc.
Security Prototype
Development
Coding
Covert Channel Anal.
System Integration
Functional Test
Security Report Desc.
Secure Distribution
Channel Plan
Oper. Test & Modif.
Documentation

Operation &
Maintenance
Process

Configuration
Management
Fault Analysis & Fix

DESCRIPTION
Continuous support and active involvement on the project. It helps to raise
security awareness and knowledge and the streamlined secure system
development with responsibility.
Compose RFP about security function by security managers integrating the inf. of
several sources such as security experts.
Evaluate proposals in the view of meeting security requirements, economical, and
technological feasibility to choose the most appropriate developer
Build the specialized security team which mainly takes a responsibility about all
SE process activities during SDLC
Define the collections of rules to protect, distribute, and control the important
electronic assets which will be physically implemented as security functions
Perform user training to give information about the objective, and general views
on the planned system & developer training to give the exact understanding on the
user security requirements
Collect security requirements of the users about the target system and analyze
them, adding security managers own security knowledge
Identify the possible threats and vulnerabilities that can affect the system’s
security, analyze an anticipated loss and effects due to accidents, and select
appropriate countermeasures
Develop sec. operation concepts that explain how system is implemented to meet
sec. requirements well, and develop the scenario that gives the developer tangible
information about diverse threats and vulnerability of the system
Analyze secure information flow by grouping objects, specifying their
interdependencies, and illustrating the interactions. The top-level in that structure
becomes a logical component by system architects, while the bottom-level
becomes a physical component to be practically implemented
Describe the specification based on outputs of security design process activity.
Develop the program that consists of critical function of the completed system for
verifying the appropriateness of the design for security requirements.
Convert the physical design into programming code
Perform trials for finding secret channel
Integrate the developed security functions with the designated hardware device
Perform functional, operational, verification, and penetration testing to evaluate
initial security requirements are well implemented & worked at the real situation
Records the findings and results from tests, including security defects, the
measures for improving them, and the results from applying the measures.
Make a plan to distribute to the users' sites through physical and managerial
channels and maintain the continuous reliable channels
Test the developed system at the real org. environment and find/fix the problems
Develop security related documents including user manual, trusted facility
manual, test documentation, design documentation and security module code
Conduct configuration management which continuously observes the changes in
information systems and promptly modifies the factors of changes
Find and fix system defects that occur due to unclear procedures, invasion, and
design problems.

Operational Training

Perform the training for users and operators about how to use developed system

Security Auditing

Perform auditing for identifying sec. policy violations that can happen in the
operational processes

Security Management

Manage all of managerial problems occurred during the SDLC, and resolves them
through mediating with supplier, system developer, operator and maintainer
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After comparing to the suggestion of the first stage that
required the addition to several lifecycle data, they
recommended that the addition decision of the documents
remain as negotiated issues during the contract period.
The detailed results of the analysis are shown in Table 3
and Figure 3, 4, and 5. The table shows that the lowest
and the highest scored items in 1st and 2nd analysis. The
mean and standard deviation value show that the result of
2nd stage has better homogeneity than that of 1st stage.

allocated it into a number of IEEE/EIA 12207 process
activities. This activity has been strongly emphasized on
SE studies (e.g., James 1996). The last issue was the
documentation. Project managers mainly indicated no
existence of the appropriate data items in which SE
activities are stored. For example, they did not mark the
connection between SE process activities and lifecycle
data in acquisition and supply processes and attached a
comment about its inappropriateness. They also
recommended the addition of four lifecycle data to the
last two processes. Based on their suggestions and the
analysis result, we developed the initial integration model.
After that, we performed the second Delphi analysis. The
analysis drew more agreements than the first one. The
mean of weighted average increased from 2.34 to 2.51 in
the case of the connection between both process activities,
and from 2.41 to 2.49 in the case of the connection
between process activities and lifecycle data. In addition,
the standard deviation of weighted average decreased
from 0.34 to 0.27 in the former connection, and from 0.30
to 0.26 in the latter one. However, two augmented issues
in the 1st analysis still remained in disagreement (low
scores) though their gap becomes narrowed. The
distinguished feature of the second analysis was
documentation. It mainly came from project managers.

Acquisition and Supply Process
As shown in Figure 3, although most of components
in these processes incorporated with one another, there
existed three problems. One is security policy. Security
policy was not strongly connected with the lifecycle
process activities and data of IEEE/EIA 12207. Another is
security management. We connected it to too many
activities of IEEE/EIA 12207 processes (i.e., supplier
monitoring, acceptance and completions). The other was
that three SE process activities were allocated into
acquisition plan, though they are not well matched. These
problems are remained as negotiation subjects of the
contract for secure system development.

Table 3. Results of Delphi Analysis (1st and 2nd Analysis)
SE vs. Lifecycle process activities

1st

2nd

Lowest Scores (Below 2.0) of the 1st and 2nd Analysis
Managerial Support-Contract Prep. Update
1.7
Sec. Team Building-Initiation
1.7
Sec. Policy Enforcement-Initialization
1.9 2.0
Sec. Policy Enf.-Contract Prep.& Update
Sec. Mgt.- Review & Evaluation

1.5
1.9

1.8

Risk Analysis-Management
2.0
Sec. Testing-Verification
2.0
Highest Scores (Upper 2.8) of the 1st and 2nd Analysis
Sec. Module Coding-S/W Coding &
2.9 2.9
Testing
Sec. System Integration-S/W Integration
2.8 2.9
Sec. Testing-S/W Coding & Testing
2.8
Sec. Testing (Operational)-Validation
Sec. Req. Anal.-System Req. Anal.
Sec. Req. Anal.-S/W Req. Anal.
Secure Distribution Channel Plan-Infra.
Documentation-Documentation
Configuration Mgt.-Configuration Mgt.
Operational Training-Training
Sec. Mgt.-Mgt.
Total Average Mean
Standard Dev.

2.8
2.9
2.9
2.9
2.9
2.9
3.0
2.9
2.34
0.34

SE Activities vs. Lifecycle Data

1st

2nd

Lowest Scores (Below 2.0) of the 1st and 2nd Analysis
Managerial Support-Acquisition Plan
1.6 1.7
RFP Prep.-Acquisition Plan
1.8 1.9
RFP Prep.-Acceptance Strategy & Cond. 1.9
Records
Sec. Policy Enforcement-Acquisition Plan
1.8 1.8
User & Developer Training-Develop. Process 2.0
Plan

Highest Scores (Upper 2.8) of the 1st and 2nd Analysis
Sec. Oper. Con. & Sce. Desc.-Con. of Oper.
2.8
Desc.
Sec. Model & Arch. Design-S/W Arch. Desc.
2.8 2.8
Sec. Module Coding-Source & Executable Obj.
2.8
Code Records
Sec. Sys. Integration-S/W Integration Plan
2.9 2.9
Documentation-User Documentation Desc.
2.8
Sec. Audit-Audit Agenda Record & Proc.
2.8 2.9

2.51
0.27

2.41
0.30
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2.49
0.26

analysis was another issue. We connected it with
system/software requirement analysis and management,
and with the concept of operations and system/software
requirement description, but it did not cover all of the
scope of risk analysis. As an alternative, we suggest that
risk analysis perform its functions with other process
activities, such as management and configuration
management.

Figure 3 Process Integration Model- Acquisition and
Supply Process

Operation and Management Process
In these processes, with the primary lifecycle process
activity, supporting and organizational process activities
assist SE process. For example, the security documents
are integrated with documentation activity in supporting
process, while secure distribution channel are with
infrastructure in organizational process. We incorporated
four lifecycle data that are not primary data into this
model. For instance, modification request and records,
test or validation plan, procedures and results reports, and
audit agenda record and procedure.
Figure 5 Process Integration Model- Operation and
Management Process
Figure 4 Process Integration Model- Development
Process

Limitations
Development Process

Although we developed the process improvement
models for secure system development, they have several
limitations addressed. First, the model was not yet to be
applied to the real situation. Although we used Delphi
analysis to preserve the objectiveness of the models, they
could not prove their effectiveness in practice. Therefore,
we need to perform the case study for applying these
models to software development projects. Second, it
does not include the tailoring guide that shows the

In this process, while most components are well
matched with one another, there were some components
that need to be integrated with supporting and
organizational process. For example, functional test was
interconnected with quality assurance and verification
activities, and security reports are combined with joint
review, problem resolution, and improvement. Risk
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Decision Making”, MIS Quarterly (22:4), 1998, pp. 441465.
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Telematics Systems," Computers & Security (16:2), 1997,
pp.145-164.
Tompkins, F.G., and Rice, R. "Integrating Security
Activities into the Software Development Lifecycle and
the Software Quality Assurance Process," Computer &
Security (5), 1986, pp.218-242.
Weiss, J. "A System Security Engineering Process," Proc.
of 14th National Computer Security Conference, 1991, pp.
572-581.

guideline how to tailor the model based on the size,
security requirement levels, budget or periods of the
project, and each industrial characteristics. And the last
since we used the simple weighted average to compute
the appropriateness of each mapping scheme, we could
not reflect the different viewpoint of each party of Delphi
analysis into the model. For example, security engineers
gives high points to managerial side SE activities, while
system engineers gives to the design and implementation
side activities. These issues are remained as future
elaboration subjects.

Conclusion
In this paper, we addressed the SE model and process
integration model with IEEE/EIA 12207. We suggested a
SE model that consists of twenty-five SE process
activities identified by the previous researches and
interviews. Also we derived the process integration model
that interrelates SE process activities to IEEE/EIA 12207
based on Delphi analysis. We expect our models to
contribute to showing how SE process activities can be
incorporated into software lifecycle process, and
providing efficient and effective process enhancement
methods for the development of a secure system
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